How people talk themselves into it
The cognitive traps, three checklists borrowed from trades that solved this before us, and the debrief that turns one outing into better judgement for the next.
Knowing the rules is not the problem
Everybody in lesson 1 knew the rules. Every person who has driven into water knew about Turn Around Don't Drown. The failure is almost never ignorance, it is a decision made under pressure by somebody who wanted a particular answer, so the last lesson is about the decision rather than the weather.
- Normalcy bias
- It has been fine every other time, so it will be fine. The ninety-nine safe outings are not evidence about the hundredth, but they feel like it.
- Target fixation
- All attention on the storm, none on the road, the time, the fuel or the way out. The thing you are watching is not the thing that will hurt you.
- Get-there-itis
- Borrowed from aviation, where it kills people regularly. The plan said be there, so you press on past the point where the plan stopped making sense.
- Overconfidence
- Experience generalised past where it applies. It is real competence, in ordinary conditions, being spent on an extraordinary one.
- Convoy groupthink
- Nobody else has turned around, so it must be fine. Everybody in the convoy is thinking exactly that, about everybody else.
Three checklists, borrowed honestly
Aviation and wildland firefighting have spent decades on exactly this problem: competent people, voluntary exposure, time pressure, and a strong pull toward the hazard. Their tools transfer well. There is no published spotter-specific adaptation of any of them, so what follows is the originals, presented as what they are.
LCES is the one to memorise. A spotting position with no second pair of eyes, no working communications, no second way out, or nowhere to shelter is not a position, whatever the view is like.
Deciding before you are in it
- Decide at home what would end the outing, and say it out loud or write it down. Darkness, a specific storm mode, losing your second escape route, losing radar, being below half a tank, being too tired.
- Run IMSAFE on yourself before you run anything on the weather.
- Run PAVE on the trip, and be honest about the E.
- Check LCES at every position, not once at the start. Positions change, and three of the four can be lost without you noticing.
- Set a hard turnaround time, and treat it as a limit rather than a target.
The debrief
Three questions, afterwards, honestly, ideally written down. This is how one outing becomes better judgement rather than just another safe outing reinforcing normalcy bias.
- What did I actually see, as distinct from what I reported and what I told people afterwards?
- What did I decide, and when? Especially the decisions that did not feel like decisions.
- What would I change? And specifically: was there a moment I talked myself past something?
Include the outings where nothing happened. Those are the ones that teach you what your own margin actually looks like, and they are the ones normalcy bias feeds on if you never examine them.
You have driven ninety minutes to a target area. The storm mode has changed to a fast line after dark, you have lost mobile signal, and you are tired. Your notes from this morning said you would stop at dark. What do you do?
Two of the wrong answers are named cognitive traps in this lesson, almost word for word.Your limit was set at the kitchen table by a version of you who was rested and not invested, and that version had better judgement than the one reading this in the car. The second option is sunk cost and get-there-itis, the fourth is convoy groupthink, and the third is the compromise that keeps you there. Losing communications alone breaks LCES.